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 The Effect of Channel Awards on Company Value 
 
Abstract 
Using signaling theory, this event study aims at determining the effect of announcements 
about marketing channel awards on recipient company value. The dataset consists of 
press releases announcing awards to U.S. public companies (1993-2012), matched with 
financial data. The analysis focuses on award recipients (n=178 events). Results indicate 
that there are no positive abnormal returns associated with channel award announce-
ments; and there is also no difference when taking the source (individual company or ex-
ternal stakeholder) of the award into account. Returns are positive, however, when 
awards are presented at dedicated events and to firms operating in concentrated indus-
tries. In effect, investors appear to value awards primarily for their visibility in recog-
nizing channel players and for their differentiation potential in concentrated markets.  
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Awards, prizes and other forms of recognition to firms are a widespread phenomenon in to-
day’s marketplace (Frey & Neckermann, 2008). In the industrial distribution sector, top per-
forming distributors are frequently recognized with awards such as “Distributor of the Year” 
or “Best Distributor” by leading companies such as IBM, Oracle and Microsoft, as well as by 
industry associations and journals such as the Business Technology Association and CRN, re-
spectively. Awards serve an important function in business-to-business relationships in terms 
of motivating partners and recognizing their exceptional performance (Anderson, Narus & 
Narayandas, 2008; Gilliland & Bello, 2001). Awards can also provide social recognition that 
gives visibility to the firm beyond the specific—in the context of this research, channel—rela-
tionship (Frey & Neckermann, 2008). As such, awards can be thought of as ‘signals’ to out-
siders about otherwise hardly observable qualities of the recipients (Basuroy, Desai & Ta-
lukdar, 2006; Connelly, Certo, Ireland & Reutzel, 2011). Previous research indicates that in-
vestors value the signaling of awards in areas such as quality improvement, human resources 
management or effective use of information technology, suggesting a revised/positive evalua-
tion of financial returns for these firms (Arthur & Cook 2009; Hendricks & Singhal, 1996). 
Yet, when it comes to studying channel awards, the extant literature has focused primarily on 
their impact on within-channel relationships, rather than on their signaling effect to the exter-
nal community concerned with evaluating firms from a financial standpoint. As noted by 
Gielens and Geyskens (2012), there is a need to better understand financial valuation of distri-
bution-related activities. Thus, a relevant question is: does company commitment to excel-
lence in performing distribution activities that are acknowledged through channel awards also 
have a positive pay-off from a financial evaluation standpoint?  
 This paper addresses this question by means of an empirical investigation of the ‘finan-
cial impact’—i.e., impact on the stock market value—of channel awards on recipient firms. 
The theoretical foundation of the study is signaling theory (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 
1973), because previous studies have looked at awards as ‘signals’ (Balasubramanian, Mathur 
& Thakur, 2005; Basuroy et al., 2006). This research investigates both the main effect of 
channel awards as signals, and their varying effectiveness depending on three contingencies 
reflecting current practice: (1) who sends the signal (individual firm versus external stake-
holder organization); (2) under what circumstance is the award presented (e.g., during a dedi-
cated event); and (3) the competitive context or industry structure (i.e., recipient firms operat-
ing under varying levels of industry concentration). We use ‘event study’ as a methodology 
by which to estimate the abnormal return—that is, the change in stock price—due to a spe-
cific event (i.e., receipt of channel award), reflecting the reactions of investors to the event it-
self (Binder, 1998; Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, 1969; MacKinlay, 1997). The dataset for the 
analysis consists of 178 announcements of channel awards received by U.S. publicly-traded 
companies from 1993 to 2012. The results of this analysis contribute to the current body of 
knowledge at the marketing-finance interface, exploring the links between marketing activi-
ties and financial returns, in the specific area of channel relationships. The research also pro-
vides indications for managers regarding whether and under which conditions, investors re-
ward companies for their excellence in distribution activities. 
   
2. Literature review 
  
In line with previous marketing and management studies focusing on the signaling function 
fulfilled by awards (Basuroy et al., 2006), this study draws on signaling theory to formulate a 
set of four hypotheses (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1973). Hypothesis one predicts a posi-
tive impact of channel awards on the recipient firm’s stock value. As signals, awards allow 
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outsiders to distinguish between products/organizations that are of higher quality versus oth-
ers (i.e., those recognized by awards versus those that have not been rewarded) (Basuroy et 
al., 2006). As higher quality firms are typically expected to outperform their competitors, pre-
vious research has documented a positive relationship between awards received and company 
(or product) performance in different domains (Arthur & Cook, 2009; Balasubramanian et al., 
2005; Gemser, Leenders & Wijnberg, 2008; Hendricks & Singhal, 1996). Therefore, in the 
channel setting at the center of this investigation, it is expected that channel awards allow in-
vestors to identify distributors that are strong performers, that have a positive relationship 
with their partners and that excel over competitors. This information may lead to revised, 
more positive, expectations with regard to the award recipient’s future performance in the fi-
nancial sphere (i.e., stock market price). Hence,   
 H1: Receiving channel awards positively impacts the market value of recipient firms. 
 Hypothesis two deals with the source of channel awards and predicts a varying impact on 
the value of recipient firms, depending on source. This hypothesis is aligned with signaling 
theory, which states that the characteristics of the sender of the signal affect the impact of the 
signal itself (Connelly et al., 2011; Gemser et al., 2008). In this study, the sender is the organ-
ization presenting the channel award and includes both private and public firms as well as ex-
ternal stakeholder organizations such as trade/industry associations and trade journals. Hen-
dricks and Singhal (1996) explain the greater effectiveness of awards that come from external 
stakeholders due to their objectivity and prestige compared to awards coming from individual 
firms. Awards given by the former are seen as providing a stronger signal for the investor as 
they reflect broader, more objective, assessments than those given by the latter. Hence,  
H2: The effect of channel awards on recipient firm market value is higher when the source 
of the award is an external stakeholder organization versus an individual company. 
 The third hypothesis predicts a different impact of awards on recipient firm value depend-
ing on the circumstances of the award is presentation. Signaling theory predicts that the man-
ner in which signals are sent contributes to their effectiveness (Connelly et al., 2011). Channel 
awards are often given by firms during specific marketing events (e.g.,Cisco Partner Summit). 
Such events are typically a key component of the marketing communication mix of these 
firms, being functional for signing contracts, exchanging information and developing business 
relationships (Sharland & Balogh, 1996). As a result, the social recognition of awards (Frey & 
Neckermann, 2008) is likely to be enhanced when they are presented during dedicated events, 
compared to awards that do not incorporate this ‘public’ dimension. Hence,   
H3: The effect of channel awards on the market value of recipient firms is higher when the 
award is presented during a dedicated event. 
 Hypothesis four builds on a key contention in signaling theory that the context in which 
the signal is sent influences its effectiveness (Connelly et al., 2011). Among the contextual 
factors relevant in the industrial distribution sector, the growing level of industry concentra-
tion is among the strongest (Tompkins International, 2013). Typically, as an industry becomes 
more concentrated, competitive activities among firms shift from price based to non-price 
based, such as advertising and innovation, as the latter allow for more differentiation among 
firms (Davies & Lyons, 1984; Ramaswamy, Gatignon & Reibstein, 1994). This study views 
channel awards as contributing to non-price based competition because channel relationships 
are among the intangible assets that firms can leverage in order to achieve competitive differ-
entiation (cfr. Srivastava, Shervani & Fahey, 1999). In other words, as industry concentration 
increases, excellence in channel relationships as reflected by the receipt of a channel award 
becomes more important for purposes of differentiation. At the same time, industry concentra-
tion affects how relationships among distributors and manufacturers develop. In highly con-
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centrated scenarios, there typically is a small number of large distributors who often have ex-
pectations of “being dealt with more like employees,…[being] given directions… [and being] 
rewarded for good performance” (Hanmer-Lloyd, 1996:182-183). Hofer, Jin, Swanson, Wal-
ler and Williams (2012) show that, in concentrated industries, the increased presence of the 
relational element ensures positive performance and pay-off for channel members. In such 
cases, a more prominent role for channel awards can be predicted. 
H4: The effect of channel awards on the market value of the recipient firm is higher in more 
concentrated markets. 
 
3. Research Method 
 
The research adopts event study methodology to investigate the effect of channel awards on 
recipient firm stock market value. The study examines security price movements around spe-
cific events with a known ‘time stamp’ (Binder, 1998; Fama et al., 1969; Srinivasan & 
Hanssens, 2009), and is built on the ‘efficient market’ hypothesis, according to which markets 
operate under conditions of perfect information and rational investors. Under this hypothesis, 
the stock price integrates all public information (Fama, 1970; Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 2004), 
where unexpected events bringing new information are reflected in the stock price (Srinivasan 
& Bharadwaj, 2004). Event study methodology is appropriate for our investigation because 
receiving a channel award is an event that cannot be known in advance by investors and also 
has a known time stamp. The standard protocol for event studies was followed in designing 
and conducting the research (Binder, 1998; MacKinlay, 1997; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997) 
with data collected via content analysis of press releases as well as from CRSP, Compustat 
and I/B/E/S. The event of interest is the channel award announcement in a press release; the 
‘stamp date’ is the date of the press release as it represents the first instance in which the news 
becomes publicly available, in line with signaling theory (Agrawal & Kamakura 1995; Con-
nelly et al., 2011). A search of Lexis Nexis and Factiva databases, covering a period of 20 
years (1993-2012), led to 2,607 press releases. After several filtering stages, including elimi-
nating scenarios involving potentially confounding events during or close to the event—e.g., 
dividend announcements, mergers, litigations, etc. (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997)—the final 
sample consisted of 178 press releases.  
The dependent variable is the abnormal return (𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ , equation (1) below), defined as “the 
actual ex post return of the stock during the course of the event window minus the expected 
normal return during the same time frame, had the event not taken place” (Srinivasan & 
Bharadwaj, 2004: 12). The benchmark model for the expected normal stock return (𝐸[𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡], 
equation (2) below) is the Fama and French (1996) three-factor-with-momentum model, as it 
explains a higher proportion of market inefficiencies (Carhart, 1997). The estimation window 
for the benchmark model consists of 100 days starting 46 days before the event (Karniouchina 
et al., 2009). 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗  is estimated by means of generalized autoregressive conditional heterosce-
dasticity (Garch) [1;1] specification, allowing “the conditional variance to change as a func-
tion of past-realized residuals and past variances” (Karniouchina et al., 2009: 251).  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸 [𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡]          (1) 
𝐸 [𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡] =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 𝑅 𝑚𝑡 +  𝑠𝑖 𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝑡 +  ℎ𝑖  𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖  𝑈𝑀𝐷 𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   (2) 
Legend:  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗ = abnormal return; 𝑅𝑖𝑡= actual stock price return; 𝐸 [𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡]= expected normal return; 𝑅 𝑚𝑡= 
return of the market portfolio estimated with CRSP equally-weighted index ; 𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝑡 = return difference be-
tween small and large firms; 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡= return difference between firms with high and low book-to-market 
ratio; 𝑈𝑀𝐷 𝑡 = momentum factor, difference in average return between the highest 30 % performing com-
panies minus the lowest 30 %; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = zero mean disturbance term. 
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To test for H2 to H4, we used cross-sectional regressions performed on the abnormal re-
turns aggregated across time for each security (MacKinlay, 1997; Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 
2004). The cumulative abnormal return (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖, equation (3) below) is calculated as the sum of 
the daily abnormal returns in equation (1) over the event window of interest. In line with pre-
vious studies, we use short event windows (MacKinlay, 1997; Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 
2004), including the date of the event (𝜏1 = 0) and the next day (𝜏2 = +1) to allow investors 
to learn about the event if, for example, the press release is issued at the end of the trading 
day. 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖  is used as the dependent variable in equation (4) (see below), which is the “cross-
sectional regression model of abnormal returns on the characteristics of the event of interest” 
(Srinivasan & Bharadwaj, 2004:19), in our case, the type of award giver (H2), the event (H3), 
and the level of industry concentration (H4). 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝜏1, 𝜏2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
∗𝜏2
𝜏=𝜏1
          (3) 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(0, +1) =  0 + 1𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 + 2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 3𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛+ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖   (4) 
Legend: External = dummy variable, taking value of 1 if giver is an external organization, 0 if else (ref. 
category=public company). Private = dummy variable, taking value of 1 if giver is a private company, 0 if 
else (ref. category=public company). Event = dummy variable, taking value of 1 if award given during a 
dedicated event and 0 if else; Industry Concentration = Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), sum of squares 
market share of top 4 firms in recipient’s SIC code  normalized (/10 000*100), lagged. X = vector of control 
variables, including: firm size, I/B/E/S no. of estimates, word count in the press release (PR) body; database 
for PR retrieval, taking value of 1 if LexisNexis, 0 if Factiva; newswire service, taking value of 1 if Business 
Wire, 0 if PR Newswire; PR issued from recipient; multiple recipients noted in PR; innovation; relationship; 




H1 was tested by means of event analysis of the CAR provided by Eventus (Cowan, 2010). 
The mean CAR associated with a channel award is -.35%, with 77 positive and 101 negative 
AR in the sample. This result, however, was found not to be statistically significant in either 
parametric (i.e., cross-sectional t = -1.593) or nonparametric (i.e., generalized sign Z=-1.322) 
tests. Thus, the findings indicate that, in general, investors neither reward nor penalize recipi-
ents of channel awards. H2 to H4 were tested by means of cross-sectional regression (table 1). 
A robust regression with least trimmed squares (LTS) analysis was used to account for bad 
leverage and outliers in the sample (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998; Rousseeuw & 
Driessen, 1999). A regression model with no random effect was retained as there was no 
strong evidence in favor of data clustering due to repeated measures.  
As shown in table 1, the data do not support H2; no significant difference was detected 
when taking the type of award giver into account (external stakeholder: 𝛽1= 0.21, S.E. = 0.60; 
private company: 𝛽2= 0.36, S.E. = 0.63). This suggests that investors do not place a different 
value on channel awards coming from different types of award givers. For H3, however, the 
results do support the positive effect on awardees’ CAR of receiving a channel award during a 
dedicated event. The parameter for the variable of interest is positive and significant (𝛽3= 
0.81, S.E. = 0.34, p <.05), suggesting that receiving an award during a dedicated event in-
creases recipient CAR. The data also provide strong support for H4, predicting a positive ef-
fect on CAR when recipient firms operate in more concentrated markets. The effect of indus-
try concentration was found to be positive and significant (𝛽4=0.06, S.E. = 0.02, p<0.001). As 
level of industry concentration increases, investors value more positively firms that receive 
channel awards. To assess the robustness of these results, several actions were undertaken 
(Karniouchina et al., 2009; MacKinlay, 1997), including: different estimation windows, 
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different event windows, different market indexes, OLS regression (detailed results available 
on request). Similar patterns were detected for the sign and significance levels of the coeffi-
cients, providing overall support for the robustness of the results.  
 
Table 1: Results for Robust Cross-sectional Regression 
   Beta (S.E.) Pr>ChiSq 
𝛽0 Intercept      -1.24 (0.94) n.s. 
𝛽1 External stakeholder award-giver H2 0.21 (0.60) n.s. 
𝛽2 Private company award-giver H2 0.36 (0.63) n.s. 
𝛽3 Dedicated event H3 0.81 (0.34) ** 
𝛽4 Industry concentration H4 0.06 (0.02) *** 
Controls (only significant variables reported) 
𝛽7 Press Release issued by recipient  -1.07 (0.47) ** 
𝛽17 NYSE  -1.18 (0.46) ** 
 Time as Fixed Effect  yes  
 R-Square  0.46  
        Legend: * p <.10; ** p <.05; *** p <.001; n.s.= not significant; year of reference: 2011 
 
  
5.  Conclusions 
 
This article enriches the body of literature at the marketing-finance interface that typically has 
paid only limited attention to distribution (Gielens & Geyskens, 2012). To our knowledge, 
this study is among the first to address the financial impact of channel management activities. 
Our findings show that, in general, channel awards do not translate into gains for recipient 
stock value. But, investors do place value on the social recognition function of awards, as un-
derlined by their positive impact when presented at dedicated events, and on their contribution 
to differentiation in concentrated industries. In effect, the results highlight that, in addition to 
being an incentive to motivate partners, channel awards positively impact the recipient’s stock 
market value under specific conditions. One important implication for managers is that, be-
cause awards presented during dedicated events appear to receive a premium return from in-
vestors, award-giving companies might emphasize these types of gatherings to showcase their 
awards and, with them, the importance they place on channel relationships. Some limitations 
of the study are acknowledged. First, the analysis focuses only on award recipients; a more 
complete picture might be obtained by looking also at award givers (analysis in progress). 
Second, the sample consists only of U.S. publicly traded companies. As countries differ in 
how pervasive is the practice of presenting prizes and awards (Frey & Neckermann, 2008), 
future research could adopt a cross-cultural perspective.  
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